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The Business of Brexit: what happens next? 
Executive Summary 
 
This is an accessible briefing for those wanting to understand the main current issues and debates 
about the form that Britain’s post-Brexit relationship with the EU will take, especially for business and 
other organizations. The intention is not to provide detailed economic, political or legal analysis of 
Brexit. Instead, it offers to well-informed but non-specialist readers explanations of what is at stake 
in the post-Brexit relationship and corrects some persistent misunderstandings and myths. The focus 
is primarily on future trade arrangements as these are at the heart of the post-Brexit future. It is 
assumed that the decision to leave the EU is irreversible and that Brexit in some form will happen. 
Given this, the briefing summarises how: 
 Amongst the different forms of Brexit, the particular form which the UK government is 
seeking is outside the single market and partially outside the customs union alongside a 
comprehensive free trade agreement. This is unlike any existing model for the relationship 
between the EU and a non-EU country. 
 There are persistent misunderstandings about what the single market means, and in 
particular how it differs from a free trade area, how it reduces non-tariff barriers to trade as 
well as tariffs, and the role of free movement of labour within it. These misunderstandings 
also impact on the government’s plan to leave the single market, which in practice looks likely 
to retain ‘by the back door’ many features of EU membership, which is potentially politically 
controversial. 
 Much debate about post-Brexit Britain has relied on a series of myths of which the most 
common variant is that the German car industry’s desire to export to the UK makes an 
advantageous trade deal likely. This and allied myths reflect a confusion about both the 
economics and politics of Brexit. 
 There are persistent misunderstandings about how in the event of no Brexit deal being 
reached there is a set of WTO rules to fall back on. This fails to understand the complexities 
of unbundling the UK from EU WTO trade schedules and the role of Mutual Recognition 
Agreements in third party trade. 
 The decision to partially leave the customs union entails the re-introduction of borders, with 
significant implications for the operation of international supply chains (the automotive 
industry being the most obvious example) as well as complex political issues (Northern 
Ireland being the most obvious example). 
 Immigration played a key role in the decision to leave the EU. Post-Brexit, this carries very 
significant implications for many organizations in terms of access to labour at a time of de 
facto full employment, and for human lives and relationships. 
 It is now recognized that although the formal period of exit negotiations will run for two 
years, until March 2019, in practice there will be a much longer period of transition to 
whatever shape the post-Brexit relationship with the EU takes. This could extend for several 
years. 
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The Business of Brexit: what happens next? 
 
1. Introduction 
Britain’s decision to leave the European Union (EU) following the June 2016 referendum (hereafter, 
Brexit) is undoubtedly the country’s most important political and economic event since the Second 
World War. Prior the referendum, the overwhelming opinion of British business was against Brexit. 
There were, of course, some high profile business people who advocated Brexit, but these were a 
minority. Numerous surveys of both large, and to a slightly lesser extent, small and medium sized 
businesses, showed this. There is now very little likelihood that Brexit will not happen in some form 
or other. The issue for business, public sector, not-for-profit and third sector organizations therefore, 
is to understand it, try to shape it, and adapt to it. 
It is worth reprising why businesses were generally opposed to Brexit, as this also frames many of the 
issues that they now face. In brief, EU membership is important to business and other organizations 
in terms of trade, access to labour markets, with these in turn impacting upon general economic 
prosperity. As regards UK trade (see tables 1, 3 and 4, Appendix), around half is with the EU-27 
(slightly more for imports, slightly less for exports), and another 16% is with non-EU countries via EU 
trade agreements. Thus in total some 66% of UK trade is bound up with EU membership. As regards 
labour markets, around 2.25 million EU-27 nationals work in the UK (see table 2, Appendix). As 
regards the effect of Brexit on the general economy, this is a matter of much dispute and conflicting 
estimates but the vast majority of forecasts predict a negative impact on growth compared with not 
having left.  
At the very least, few would deny that it is a major change with effects that are unpredictable. It is 
probably as foolish to pore over each and every economic indicator within such an uncertain context 
as to try to predict them. The more or less undeniable broad contours so far are that the value of 
sterling fell considerably as a result of Brexit and that this is beginning to feed through to price 
inflation because of UK dependence on imports, and hence to falling real wages. Consumer spending 
held up in the immediate aftermath of the vote to leave, but this was fuelled by borrowing and is now 
slowing. Business investment began to fall in the final quarter of 2016. At the time of writing there is 
no evidence of rising unemployment, however. 
The long-term effects of Brexit will inevitably depend primarily upon the future institutional 
arrangements for trade, which are inseparable from those for immigration and therefore the labour 
market. The purpose of this briefing is to explain the debates and issues around those arrangements. 
Inevitably these debates and issues are rapidly changing and in order to be as up to date as possible 
the main sources linked to are reputable current news stories rather than academic analysis. The aim 
is to offer a snap shot of where we are now in a process which will last for many years, and with 
consequences for many more. 
2. Understanding Brexit 
The core difficulty in predicting what happens after Brexit is that its meaning is unclear. This reflects 
the fact that the Leave campaign was primarily one against EU membership but was not for any 
particular form of Brexit. Leading figures within the campaign advocated radically different versions 
of Brexit, so it is fair to say that those who voted to leave also endorsed different models.  
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In particular, many ‘Leavers’ (including for many years, although not during the campaign itself, 
UKIP) advocated a ‘Norway’ or ‘Switzerland’ model of Brexit. Although different in detail, both these 
entailed membership of the European single market, but not the customs union (both of these are 
discussed in more detail below). Others advocated a ‘Turkey’ model of being a party to the customs 
union but not the single market. Others, still, advocated what became called a ‘Canada’ model of a 
Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the EU, with no single market or customs union membership. 
Finally, some envisaged none of these, but trading with the EU purely on World Trade Organization 
(WTO) terms (see section 4).  
Since no single model was specified to the voters, all of these would have been compatible with the 
vote to leave. In any case, debate was often conducted in terms of single market ‘access’, but that 
does not aid understanding because every country has ‘access’ to the single market: the issue that 
matters is in what form and on what terms. Voters may well have believed that ‘access is access’, but 
as the models just mentioned show, this is not so. 
For several months after the referendum, the UK government avoided specifying what version of 
Brexit they favoured, using the formula ‘Brexit means Brexit’. Although mocked in some quarters, 
this was not altogether meaningless in that it denoted that there would be no attempt to reverse the 
referendum decision. It did, however remain ambiguous as to whether the UK would undertake what 
became called a ‘soft Brexit’ (meaning, remaining in the single market) or a ‘hard Brexit’ (meaning, 
leaving the single market).  
This ambiguity was largely removed by the Prime Minister’s Lancaster House speech of January 2017 
and the subsequent government White Paper. This made it clear that Britain would leave the single 
market and also elements of the customs union whilst seeking an FTA with the EU. In this sense, it 
endorsed hard Brexit. However, exactly what that means in practice remains unclear, and it is unlike 
any existing model for a relationship between the EU and a non-member state. Moreover, the 
possibility of what could be called ‘ultra Brexit’ (exit without an FTA, with trade on WTO terms) was 
left open if no satisfactory FTA was achieved1. 
Even judged as a statement of intent for hard Brexit, the White Paper could be read in different ways, 
and issues of timescale were and are unclear (see section 7). In particular, quite what extent of single 
market participation could result is unclear. In any case, the shape that Brexit will take will be 
determined as much, or more, by the EU as it will be by UK government intentions. That is not simply, 
and probably not primarily, a matter of economics but of politics. 
During the referendum (and, often, since) that matter was presented as a simple one in which the 
self-interest of, in particular, German car makers would determine the EU stance. It was expressed 
by many leading Leave campaigners in very similar terms, of which this from veteran Tory 
Eurosceptic David Davis (now the Brexit Secretary) was typical: 
“Within minutes of a vote for Brexit the CEO’s of Mercedes, BMW, VW and Audi will be knocking 
down Chancellor Merkel’s door demanding that there be no barriers to German access to the British 
market.” 
There are several things that can be said about this. Firstly, it shows considerable naivety about how 
government trade policies are made. Neither in Germany, nor anywhere else, is it just a matter of 
                                                          
1 As time has gone on there has been some slippage in terminology. Originally ‘soft’ meant in the single market and ‘hard’ 
meant leaving it. Now that the government have opted for hard Brexit this is becoming called ‘soft Brexit’ by contrast with 
the even ‘harder’ no deal/WTO version which is being re-named as ‘hard’. For clarity, I continue with the original 
terminology, and call the no deal/WTO version ‘ultra Brexit’. 
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demands from leading manufacturers to the country’s leaders. Second, it shows a lack of realism 
about how the EU does trade deals, including any post-Brexit deal with the UK, which would not be 
done by Germany but by the whole of the EU. Third, it contains a major contradiction: Brexiters 
usually complain that the EU is slow and lumbering, with trade deals taking far longer than necessary. 
Yet they claimed that a post-Brexit trade deal would be done with alacrity (see section 7 for more 
detail on timescales). 
In any case, the consensus view of the UK car industry was clear. In March 2016, BMW wrote to all its 
UK employees in Rolls-Royce and Mini opposing Brexit and a survey of the British Society of Motor 
Manufacturers and Traders found that 77% of its members wanted to remain in the EU. Nissan and 
Toyota, both big investors in the UK car industry, wanted Britain to remain in the EU. And Honda’s 
CEO said that "Anything that weakens our ability to trade with the EU region would be detrimental 
to UK manufacturing". These firms matter to the UK in terms of exports, jobs and foreign direct 
investment because in the UK car industry there are 770,000 people employed with 53.1% of vehicles 
produced going to the EU. 
There are many variants of the same basic issue (other common examples include the Italian wine 
industry and the French cheese industry) but the core point is not economic but political. It can’t make 
sense to the EU for the terms of being a member to be no better than the terms of not being a 
member, as several leading EU figures have repeatedly stated. Moreover, individual countries with 
the EU will each have their own interests, in many cases nothing to do with trade as they do little 
trade with the UK (see Table 3, Appendix). And, in point of fact, the German car industry has not made 
the kind of intervention anticipated by Brexiters and shows no signs of doing so. 
The underlying logic of the ‘German car manufacturer myth’ is a wider idea that the EU needs the UK 
more than the UK needs the EU because the UK runs a trade deficit with the EU. This argument has 
little to commend it because in percentage terms far more British trade is bound up with the EU than 
vice versa (see Table 4, Appendix). There is, in any case, an additional problem with the ‘deficit as 
lever’ argument: if it is true, then it has to be recognized that the deficit is in goods trade, whereas 
the UK has a trade surplus with the EU in services. If the deficit really is a strength, then the services 
surplus must be a weakness. This is especially important for the UK’s service-based economy (about 
80% of GDP) and, in fact, this is an issue of more general importance in that neither FTAs nor WTO 
rules offer significant coverage of trade in services. This goes to the heart of the distinctive nature of 
the European single market. 
3. Understanding the single market 
Both before the referendum and since there has been a persistent confusion about what the 
European single market is, and this confusion also informs the way in which the government plans to 
leave it. The confusion is to think of the single market as being the same as a free trade area and, 
associated, to equate this with ‘tariff-free trade’. In brief (see here for more detail), a single market is 
not just about tariff-free trade and the removal of quotas; it is also about the removal of non-tariff 
barriers to trade and it is from this that most EU regulatory harmonization flows. Non-tariffs are the 
most technically complex and significant barriers to trade and are most especially pertinent to 
services. This is particularly important to the UK since, as noted above, it is a predominantly service-
based economy. 
Similarly, single market membership entails free movement of people not as a kind of a bolt-on 
which, for some ideological reason, the EU insists on but as a core part of the definition of what a 
single market is: a complete unification of production and consumption of goods and services 
(including, also, free movement of capital). You can no more be a member of the EU single market 
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without free movement of labour than you could have a functioning UK single market that restricted 
movement of people between different counties. To do so would by definition create separate 
markets in labour (and, for that matter, housing). In a sense, the absence of free movement can be 
seen as a species of non-tariff barrier in preventing a single market from fully existing (albeit that, as 
this helpful explainer shows, free movement of people is not the free-for-all that it is sometimes 
thought to be). 
That this has not been properly understood is evidenced by an interesting insider account of the 
referendum campaign, written by Daniel Korski, formerly Deputy Director of David Cameron’s Policy 
Unit. He records the frustration during the pre-referendum re-negotiation with the EU:   
“Nor would our counterparts in Europe acknowledge that the EU’s four freedoms are very much divisible. 
A country can reduce tariffs and remove trade barriers and still maintain restrictions on which foreigners 
are allowed to enter the country. This is what the United States has done since World War II, with NAFTA 
being the best example.” 
These sentences absolutely expose the core misunderstanding: NAFTA is not a single market, it is a 
free trade area. They are fundamentally different things. The four freedoms are indivisible not 
because the EU won’t ‘acknowledge’ it but as a matter of definition. In this sense the EU’s expression 
that it will not allow ‘cherry-picking’ is a misleading one: the cherries cannot be picked because they 
are inseparable from the tree. It is ironic that the development of an EU single market was 
championed most enthusiastically by successive British governments since the 1980s, and yet they 
seem not to have understood what they were championing. Nor can it be said often enough that 
before the Referendum many in the Leave campaign explicitly said that leaving the EU did not mean 
leaving the single market. 
The government’s decision to cease to be a member of the single market is apparently based on a 
realization that membership isn’t going to be unbundled from free movement, but still seems to see 
this as just an intransigent negotiating position on the part of the EU and not a definitional issue of 
what the single market means. Hence what seems to be envisaged in the White Paper is to recreate 
just about every feature of the single market for the UK (even, on my reading, a form of CJEU 
jurisdiction, albeit via the back door of a dispute resolution system) except for free movement of 
people. Thus paragraph 8.1 states the intention that: 
“Our new relationship should aim for the freest possible trade in goods and services between the UK and 
the EU. It should give UK companies the maximum freedom to trade with and operate within European 
markets and let European businesses do the same in the UK”. 
These words (along with several other indications in the white paper) suggest strongly all of the 
regulatory harmonization and non-tariff barrier avoidance that the single market entails, save for 
that relating to free movement of people. 
So the government’s aim appears to be to ‘get round’ freedom of movement of people by creating 
between the UK and the EU something akin to the free trade area that Daniel Korski (and, by 
implication, David Cameron) believed the single market was, or should be. The idea is to shoehorn 
together two fundamentally different models of international trade. It obviously remains to be seen 
whether such an arrangement will be created but it seems unlikely to be possible. 
4. Understanding the WTO option 
If it is not possible to do the kind of deal the government White Paper envisages, then the supposed 
fallback position is the ‘WTO option’. When Theresa May said that “no deal is better than a bad deal” 
it was widely interpreted that is what she meant. It bears saying, first of all, that if the UK leaves the 
EU with no deal, it will have a huge impact well beyond trade – everything from airline flying rights to 
data transfer protocols would be affected, each of which is a hugely complex issue in its own right. 
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As regards trade, May was channelling what has been a persistent Brexiter myth going back well 
before the referendum. The myth is that WTO rules offer some kind of basic, entry-level framework 
for international trade which is sitting, ready and waiting, for the UK to ‘revert to’. Nested within that 
myth is another one, namely that what is at stake in international trade rules is primarily, or even 
solely, tariffs. And nested within that is an idea that it is companies that do trade, not governments, 
so that international trade rules and agreements are a nicety if not an irrelevance. 
That latter point is hardly worth discussing. Apart from smuggling, no international trade can occur 
in the absence of some set of laws and regulations that transcend the nation state. The idea of free 
trade as a kind of state of nature as it appears within Brexit mythology has been comprehensively 
debunked by Professor Steven Weatherill of Oxford University writing on the EU Law Analysis blog. 
This is also why the Brexiter idea of sovereignty is rather naïve: as soon as international trade occurs 
some diminution of sovereignty (in the sense that they mean it) is entailed. This applies quite as much 
to the WTO as the EU – arguably even more so in terms of transparency and accountability - and 
indeed the WTO is often criticised by activists on these grounds.  
The other issues are much more complicated. The first is the complexity of unbundling the UK from 
the EU’s membership of WTO. Brexiters talk of this as ‘regaining our seat’, but far more is involved 
than moving around the table, as respected ex-WTO official Peter Ungaphakhorn has explained. 
Trading on WTO terms is not just a matter of adopting a certain tariff regime. Within that, countries 
have different quotas of trade, with different tariff levels above and below the quota. Thus 
unbundling the UK from the EU entails establishing what proportion of EU trade in a massive number 
of goods can be attributed to the UK. This is not just a mind bogglingly complex technical matter, 
although it is surely that, but also entails potentially acrimonious political negotiations not just with 
the EU but with other WTO members. Depending on which good is under discussion, over 160 
different countries – some friendly, some hostile to the UK – will have significant interests at stake. 
To get a flavour of what is involved, read this explanation of the issues using the example of trade in 
lamb. 
In any case, tariffs and even quotas on trade in goods are not the main issues at stake here. The WTO 
framework has only limited applicability to trade in services and to non-tariff barriers to trade in both 
good and services (for an overview, see this briefing from Sussex University’s UK Trade Policy 
Observatory), and indeed has in many other respects been stalled since the failure of the so-called 
Doha Round that began in 2001 and effectively abandoned last year. In this sense, the idea of WTO 
rules as a comprehensive trade framework is a misnomer. A related misnomer is that countries such 
as the USA and China trade with the EU without either single market membership or a free trade 
agreement. The implication is that these countries simply trade on WTO terms. They do not. 
In fact, such countries trade via a complex web of Mutual Recognition Agreements (MRAs) which are 
principally concerned with removing the non-tariff barriers to trade which are, in most cases, far more 
important than tariffs. Each MRA is a highly technical and, in most cases, lengthy document and the 
outcome of long periods of negotiation. The USA, for example, has some 135 MRAs with the EU, and 
China has 65. On Brexit with no deal, not only would the UK not have any MRAs with the EU but it 
would also have exited the EU’s MRAs with countries like the USA and China. For none of these MRAs 
exist as part of the WTO rules to which the UK will supposedly revert. It is for this reason that the pro-
Brexit writer Peter North of the Leave Alliance says: 
“One can say, unequivocally, that the UK could not survive as a trading nation by relying on the WTO 
Option. It would be an unmitigated disaster, and no responsible government would allow it.” 
5. Understanding borders 
Much discussion of post-Brexit trade seems to envisage it in terms of something being made in 
country X and then sold in country Y. This is a misnomer which came to public attention after the 
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referendum partly because of the PSA takeover of Vauxhall and its potential implications for job 
losses post-Brexit, partly because of Ford’s announcement of job losses in Wales, and partly because 
of doubts as to whether BMW will build the electric mini in the UK. What is at stake here is not so 
much Britain leaving the single market as leaving the customs union which ensures frictionless 
movement of goods across borders without checks. 
Many modern industries, including the car industry, are characterised by international supply chains. 
Again, there is a simplistic image of this as being like a transnational assembly line, with part-finished 
goods moving to their next stage in a different country. But, again, the reality is far more complex. In 
fact, car components move multiple times across borders before the finished item is ready for sale. 
Thus, for example, the crankshaft for a BMW Mini moves across the channel three times during 
production and this process is repeated (often with more than three shipments) for hundreds if not 
thousands of parts within a car. Moreover, it needs to be done with a time accuracy in the minutes, 
so any delays caused for example by customs checks are disastrous. No British-made vehicle is 
composed wholly of parts made in Britain. In fact, on average 41% of parts are made in the UK. That 
number is significant because 50% of a car (by value) must be made within a country for it to conform 
to WTO origin of production rules. With the exception of some models produced by Jaguar Land 
Rover, no British car meets this figure and most don’t approach it. For the Vauxhall Astra, for 
example, the figure is 25%. 
It’s probably true that the car industry is the most extreme example of highly integrated international 
supply chain management, but the same principle applies to many other industries and, in any case, 
the car industry is especially important both in terms of the quality of the employment it offers and 
the numbers, directly and indirectly, employed. It’s not possible to be certain what the effects of 
Brexit will be on the car industry, but they cannot be anything but disruptive.  
Movement across borders has also come to the fore since the referendum with the realization that 
hard Brexit will have massive consequences for the border between Northern Ireland and the 
Republic of Ireland. Issues here include things similar to the car industry – milk, for example, can move 
five times across Irish border during processing. Drinks manufacturer Diageo products include 
Guinness which crosses the border twice during production, and they estimate that exiting the 
customs union will add an extra £85 to each lorry load of the beer.  However, for obvious historical 
reasons, what matters even more are the political consequences which become especially acute 
given the constant movement of people between, and their relationships across, the border. 
This brings us to the parallel matter of freedom of movement of people across borders. A key 
argument for Brexit was ‘regaining control of our borders’. In fact, since Britain is not a party to the 
Schengen Agreement she retains – and enforces – border controls. This conflation of free movement 
of people and migration was alluded to by Sir Ivan Rogers, former UK Ambassador to the EU, in his 
evidence to the House of Commons Exiting the EU Committee (p.10) 
They [the rest of the EU] genuinely do not understand a UK debate in which the two are conflated at all. 
They do not understand why a Government would have a migration target covering migration from 
within the European Union, which for other people is not migration. They do not call it migration; they 
do not call it immigration. They call it free movement… [t]hey said, “But one is migration, which is 
external to the European Union, and the other is free movement of people, which is not at all the same 
thing”. 
 
This again reflects the longstanding British failure to understand what a single market is and how it 
differs from a free trade area (see section 3). More specifically it, too, flows from a naïve image, this 
time of immigration within a single market. As with trade, it is not a matter of person X moving to 
country Y to take a job since such movements become bound up with human relationships and 
families. 
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There is a pervasive response to all these issues which is to say ‘but we managed perfectly well before 
being in the EU’. With respect to business organizations, this is simply irrelevant: the world of 
international supply chains and just-in-time management barely existed in the early 1970s and not 
remotely in the form that it now does. With respect to Ireland, the Common Travel Area did indeed 
pre-date the EU but the situation now is that Ireland is in the EU and there is free movement of people 
from other EU countries into Ireland so on hard Brexit a hard border with the North is inevitable if 
there is to be border control. In a recent article in the Daily Telegraph on the implications of Brexit for 
Ireland and Northern Ireland there is a revealing sentence from an unnamed British civil servant work 
on Brexit: “It seems as if every day something new we hadn’t thought of comes up”. This seems very 
much to be the case with the implications of leaving the customs union, with the UK Chamber of 
Shipping recently warning of an “absolute catastrophe” if the issue of borders and customs checks is 
not satisfactorily resolved. 
 
This brief discussion of borders again illustrates how issues of trade and issues of migration are 
inseparable within the single market and, therefore, within arrangements to leave it. But whereas 
borderless trade is relatively politically straightforward (at least leaving aside questions of CJEU 
jurisdiction) migration is far more controversial. 
 
6. Understanding free movement of labour 
There is little doubt that immigration was a major reason why Britain voted to leave the EU. Yet from 
an organizational perspective Britain needs more immigration, not less. Whole sectors of British 
economy and society are not sustainable without immigration at present or higher levels. These 
sectors span the skill range from agriculture, catering and care homes through to scientific research, 
medicine and finance. 
The reason for this is two-fold. First, because the British economy is running at what in economists’ 
terms is probably full employment. That does not mean zero unemployment, as there is always a 
tranche of people who are unemployed because they are temporarily between jobs or because they 
are to all intents and purposes unemployable. To see what this means, watch the instructive BBC film 
from 2010 on ‘the day the immigrants left’. It shows British people bemoaning being unemployed due 
to immigration but, when given the chance to do the jobs undertaken by immigrants, being for the 
most part completely incapable of doing so even at the most basic level of turning up on time.  
It is not the case that these people are kept out of jobs by immigrants – that is the well-described 
‘lump of labour fallacy’ - although it is the case that some of those currently unemployable could 
become employable with training and education. And this can and should occur whether or not 
Britain is in the EU. But training and education will not render large numbers of them capable of doing 
the high skill science and finance jobs that many EU immigrants undertake, or large enough numbers 
to fill the low skill jobs. 
The second reason is demographic. Britain has an ageing population, and to sustain it entails an influx 
of economically active people in order to sustain economic growth and to support pension payments. 
It’s possible that one way of dealing with this, rather than immigration, is for British citizens to work 
longer before they get their pensions, and indeed it has been mooted that this will indeed be a 
consequence of Brexit. But it is unlikely to be popular or to match the skill profile needed. 
A naïve response to this is to say that if wages were higher then the British workforce could fill the 
gaps of immigration. The reason this is naïve is because if the people aren’t there to work then higher 
wages won’t create them. At best, higher wages in, say, the care sector will lead to labour shortages 
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in, say, the retail sector. And whilst many may favour higher wages they mean higher prices. Do 
people want to pay those, on top of the higher prices already caused by Brexit because of the collapse 
of sterling? In any case, as wages rise investment in mechanization becomes more attractive to 
companies, with rapidly developing robotic technology likely to be a growing possibility.  
There’s also a lazy response to this, which is to say that immigration puts pressure on public services. 
It’s lazy because EU immigrants are net contributors to the public finances: the issue isn’t immigration 
it’s the use made of the funds contributed by immigrants. In fact free movement of labour within the 
EU is a particularly effective way ensuring net contribution precisely because of the ease of 
movement in both directions – EU migrants tend to come to work in the UK when they are 
economically active but not to retire in the UK. 
The fact that Britain needs immigration is acknowledged, even by Brexiters. Hence David Davis and 
others have said that it will continue post-Brexit, something confirmed by Home Secretary Amber 
Rudd. The difference, it seems, will be that it will be via some kind of work permit scheme (yet to be 
set out). Plus any new trade deals with, for example, India, are likely to come with a relaxation of 
immigration restrictions from such countries.  
Meanwhile, for those who are not concerned about immigration it just means an extra layer of 
bureaucracy and cost, in having to apply and pay for immigrant employment. Is it, then, a matter of 
no change other than increased costs for businesses (not that these are negligible)? No, because 
although at the low skill level of immigration – where all the political fuss has been – it won’t make 
much difference to numbers, at the high skill level it surely will. They will not be so willing to go 
through bureaucratic hoops to come to the UK, especially when bringing families with them. 
The British economy needs immigration, and free movement within the EU is by far and away the 
easiest way for this to happen. It enables supply and demand in labour markets to be easily matched. 
No other system allows this, and the benefits are not just economic because it allows all the human 
things around the labour market (relationships, children) to happen easily as well. Huge numbers of 
families in the UK (and in the rest of the EU) are now intermingled. That last point matters because 
migration should not just be seen in transactional, economic terms but also in cultural and human 
terms. This is an important point for organizations to consider, as the human resource issues posed 
by Brexit are not just to do with ease of recruitment but also managing the insecurities and concerns 
of existing EU-27 employees.  
7. Conclusion: where do we go from here? 
At the time of writing, a general election campaign is underway. The widespread expectation based 
on opinion polls is that the outcome will be the return of Theresa May’s government with an increased 
majority2. Many commentators believe that this will have the effect of weakening the ‘ultra-Brexiters’ 
who want Brexit with no deal in place (i.e. WTO terms) and, certainly, this was the judgment of the 
financial markets which is why sterling rose after the election was announced. Assuming this is so, it 
means that the UK will seek something like the form of Brexit set out in the White Paper. 
The timescale for achieving this is another area of persistent misunderstanding, which is only now 
becoming slightly clearer. Interviewed in April, the Prime Minister indicated that there was no 
prospect of a trade deal with the EU being signed within two years, and that if and when it happened 
it would be with the UK as a third party (i.e. outside of the EU) rather than as part and parcel of the 
                                                          
2 If the polls turn out to be wrong, and the Conservatives lose the election, much of this briefing will become superseded 
and, in particular, some form of single market membership might come back on to the agenda. 
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Article 50 negotiations. This means, in turn, that it will fall under a different process which requires 
unanimous ratification by EU member states, rather than the qualified majority of the Council (plus 
simple majority of the European Parliament) needed to agree the exit terms. 
In one way, this is not surprising as anyone with any familiarity with the issue already knew that this 
was how things would be, and it was heavily trailed by the EU during the referendum campaign and 
since. Article 50 only covers the exit terms (albeit “taking account of” the shape of future 
arrangements) and it would actually have been quite conceivable that no trade talks would even 
begin until after these had been settled. In fact, the EU position on this has turned out to be relatively 
soft, with the Council (and now the Parliament) agreeing to begin talks on future trade once they 
judge that ‘sufficient progress’ has been made on the exit terms negotiation. 
However, hitherto the government had at the very least implied that exit and trade talks would be 
completed within two years, and certainly had asked in the Article 50 letter that they would occur in 
parallel from the beginning of the Article 50 period. It’s true that May had been rather ambiguous in 
the past. She had talked of ‘reaching an agreement’ within the two years which would then take 
longer to implement. That could, at a pinch, mean just the outlines of an agreement but in reality 
implementation could not begin until agreement had been completed. So the strong implication was 
undoubtedly that pretty much everything would be agreed within the two years. That is now out of 
the question, as are parallel talks from the outset of the process. 
Whatever ambiguity there may have been in the government’s position until now, there is no doubt 
at all that Brexiters claimed – both before the referendum and since – that a trade deal, and moreover 
an advantageous trade deal, would be easy to achieve, and in less than two years. Last October Boris 
Johnson claimed that 18 months was “absolutely ample” to get a “great deal”. As recently as 30 March 
veteran Eurosceptic Peter Lilley said that “there’s no reason why it [a trade deal with the EU] should 
take more than ten minutes”. Even taken as a figure of speech that is clearly absurd. 
The time frame now being implied by the government matters because, amongst other things, the 
length of time it will take and the uncertainty about the terms on which it will happen, if at all, directly 
affect companies’ willingness to invest and their decisions about relocation. In many cases, as is being 
seen in the financial sector, relocation processes take a long time and must therefore be decided on 
well before any completion of trade negotiations. It also affects individuals residing in different 
member states as to what the future holds for them. So how long will it take? The best estimate would 
still seem to be the two to ten year period which Sir Ivan Rogers was hounded out of office for 
reporting in January. He has since suggested that a ratified deal by the mid-2020s is likely. It is worth 
noting that at the same time he predicted that the EU would not allow a sector-by-sector single 
market deal (something floated in the White Paper) and that has now been proved right by the EU 
Council’s draft guidelines.  
Pro-Brexit politicians often argue that this deal can be much quicker than a normal trade deal because 
standards and regulations are already harmonized between the UK and the EU and it is this which 
takes the time in trade negotiations. But that misses the point that, precisely, this will not be a normal 
trade negotiation. Normally, the intention is to improve the ease of trade. This time, it is to erect 
barriers. If the Brexiters mean that the UK can in effect stay in the single market in every way except 
for freedom of movement of people and CJEU jurisdiction then they have been missing the whole 
point of what the EU means by ‘no cherrypicking’. The matters of lengthy dispute will not be about 
standards harmonization, they will be about, primarily dispute resolution systems and possibly a 
preferential immigration system. Moreover, because this deal will need unanimity there will have to 
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be votes in all national and some regional parliaments before ratification. That all takes time and can 
be unpredictable, as the recent Canadian FTA experience has shown. 
So for all these reasons the Rogers’ estimate of timescale still looks reasonable. This, then, means – 
and May, again, seems to have conceded it is so – that there will be a long period during which the 
UK remains within the single market, under CJEU jurisdiction and with freedom of movement. It will 
not be a ‘no deal better than a bad deal’ WTO scenario, as talks will still be ongoing. An additional 
aspect of this is that it will also mean that the UK is still in the customs union and, therefore, that no 
new trade deals with non-EU countries can be signed in the interim. How long the interim will last is 
impossible to say. The EU Parliament have suggested they will not agree for it to go beyond a 
maximum of three years. It is possible that could be negotiated to be longer but even if not it still 
takes us to 2022; some have suggested a seven-year EEA interim after completion of EU exit in 2019, 
taking us to 2026.  
The political consequences of that are very difficult to imagine or predict. One is that since the UK 
will have left in 2019 it will no longer have any representation within the EU and certainly no MEPs in 
the European Parliament, even though EU decisions will continue to affect the UK.  Beyond that, 
clearly much can change in such a time frame. To get a sense of how much, suppose that the interim 
period did go on until 2026, ten years after the Referendum. Then consider what was happening in 
2006, ten years before the Referendum. That was when David Cameron in his first conference speech 
as Tory leader warned his party to stop “banging on about Europe”. 
This only serves to underscore the difficulties of making predictions about the future. And whilst that 
is true in general, it is especially true of Brexit. Stripped back to essentials, what is underway is 
something without parallel in modern economic history: an attempt simultaneously to detach and 
re-attach a major trading economy from and to the global economic system. It is the economic 
equivalent of trying to re-build an aeroplane whilst in flight. At the very least a considerable degree 
of turbulence can be expected. It remains to be seen whether the result will be a catastrophic crash. 
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